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Abstract 
Collaging epistolary passage and theoretical discussion, this article both embodies and 
investigates the intimate, cerebral and emotional voice as a post-critical device and a 
politics of the personal-made-public. Forms of critical memoir and autotheory are 
examined as rhetorical forms where criticality is charged by correlation to one’s own life. 
First-person critique, or the ‘radically intimate’, is recognized as a post-critical turn and 
as a revisionist return to poststructuralist critiques of subjectivity and citational practices 
of self-writing. A particular focus is this mode of enquiry applied to art writing and acting 
as a meta-critique of the conditions of creative practice. As a self-reflexive research 
methodology, it is argued that first-person observation, inflected by affect, intimacy and 
the quotidian, can be understood not only as a countercultural trend but as a radical 
intervention in the means, production and historiography of contemporary art, literature 








After you moved to North America you wrote how you had realized so much of you is 
habit. You wrote that good therapeutic processes always support the breaking of the 
habitual. You were thinking that the habitual had to be reinvented. Reinvented, or 
perhaps resolved, a process warranting incremental adjustments in order to dampen the 
riot in your gut. This sense of revision and resolution is a form of optimism, a remedial 
fantasy that desire, experience, life might cohere into some greater, stable meaning. I live 
with the same temporal pressures you do and know that thinking about one thing in terms 
of another can either illuminate or obscure both. Or that perhaps thinking, and the 
unending emphasis on some problem or another, is part of the problem. 
‘What is the alternative to cynical resignation on the one hand and naïve optimism 
on the other?’ asks Jack Halberstam in the introduction to The Queer Art of Failure, 
stating that ‘this question announces a political project, begs for a grammar of possibility, 
[…] and expresses a basic desire to live life otherwise’ (Halberstam 2011: 2). This 
enterprise is not without its challenges. 
When we spoke, we agreed not to feel anything, to choose gravity over disgrace. 
To learn to live with and not for. Where in fact my mind still raced with all the said and 
unsaid, everything done and undone. I wrote to you while on the Amtrak from Montréal 
to New York City. An archetypal scene already so familiar. At the border, the bus was 
stationary for over an hour and customs officers ceremoniously filed down the aisles, 
‘Where are you going?’, ‘Where have you been?’, ‘What are you doing?’, ‘You got 
anything to declare?’. 
‘You got anything to declare?’ 
We’re both going to fail, fail, fail each other. And ourselves too (Rankine 2015). 
‘Sorry, I thought you were joking about being a coward’, you said, ‘you aren’t 
and I understand’. 
You wrote to me again, this time about mistaken identity and Paul Auster. Our 
reacquaintings, invariably at critical junctures, act as markers. Your e-mail comes after a 
month of nothing, a habitual trigger message that is always in communion with the words 
of others. Always a vicarious and transitional act, relational and associative, of speaking 
through an objective other. You wrote that we are porous bodies, not cocooned brains. 
You wrote that neither a walk, or a talk, or a swim or a fucking horse ride is singly 
enough to help us out. One must pass and repass through all of this in order to plough 
some furrows, grasp the discourse and find a new grammar of possibility. 
‘I don’t care about your life’, poet and critic Jason Guriel titled an article written 
in 2016 for Canadian magazine, The Walrus. The article bemoans the first-person 
pronoun as a conspicuous ‘handy prop’ – a kind of structural conceit and a ‘selfie-stick’ 
aimed at the essayist (Guriel 2016). His account of a post-Internet surge in ‘confessional 
criticism’ claims that ‘relating works of art to one’s life, after all, is easy [as] no reference 
library is required’ (2016). In considering writers and critics who are ‘indecently self-
interested [and] who can’t seem to keep themselves out of their sentences’, Guriel refers 
to a number of contemporary writers working in a manner combining lyricism and 
critique, autobiography and politics, memoir and theory (2016). Writing that not only 
foregrounds emotion but even indulges in it. The shameless implacable ‘I’ (Didion 2006: 
104). The public ‘I’ that can, apparently, only ever face inwards. 
Heavy-hearted, lighthearted; you wrote that you found a petulant sense of self-
importance a particular affliction of many people of our generation and shtick – that this 
position rests on the implied assumption that what we might be doing or thinking is of 
greater significance than anything or anyone else. Such accusations instrumentalize and 
mystify; they call for dutiful paid passage to the boundaries between intellectual and/or 
political project and subjective experience – a mode of enquiry that overlooks the 
remedial and denies thought’s intimate relation to life, instead presenting the belief that 
‘others, any others, all others, are by definition more interesting [or important] than 
ourselves’ (Didion 2006: 104). ‘But my convictions and motivations are alarmingly 
contingent’, you confessed, ‘and I am often very unclear about what to do with my life’. 
Uncertain. Difficult. Writing from the margins. A life without sufficient constraints 
produces aimlessness, alienation and boredom, you might well have said, forgetting that 
those who have travelled from the centre to the margin might voice an important 
anecdote full of radical possibilities of knowing and unknowing. 
Writing until his death in 1932, Fernando Pessoa, in his self-proclaimed ‘factless 
autobiography’, admits ‘I write down what I feel in order to lower the fever of feeling’ 
(Pessoa 1998: 24). The Book of Disquiet, a memoir written over the course of Pessoa’s 
life and first published 47 years posthumously, foregrounds emotion and articulates a 
structure of feeling while at the same time reconciling the self-reflexivity and affects 
entangled with personal impact, historical context and political urgencies. Despite an 
apparent factless ease, Pessoa’s deeply self-interested story is not written with lack of 
critical concern. In fact, his work presents a model for poetics and critique that can be 
read throughout the histories of criticism and literature at large – a long lineage of writers 
of the personal performing the self in both heartfelt and paradoxical ways (e.g., artists 
and poets of The New York School, writers of New Journalism, the New Narrative 
writers – and as far back as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions and the Age of 
Sensibility). Their writing presents a model that organizes many feelings, binaries that 
interlace, each stimulating and moderating the other’s excesses. Intensities of joy and 
pain, longing and loss, ambivalence and determination, cruelty and compassion present a 
method for living arising from critique predicated on the present and on the quotidian. In 
an intergenerational scene of exchange, Pessoa’s work returns like a contemporary voice, 
speaking among friends, with many echoing his ‘fever of feeling’. 
This practice of self-reflexive critique is not only deeply invested in the idea that 
criticism is social but it begs the question of how one might relate one’s life to art and 
culture, alongside acknowledging the inexplicable links that a singular experience has to 
larger cultural and sociopolitical phenomena. How might the record of one’s self and 
one’s body disclose ways to reconcile the intellectual and the emotional, the public and 
the private, theory and the everyday with personal impact? As a discrete intervention into 
cultural and sociopolitical circumstances that threaten to engulf us, such writers might 
subversively oscillate between critic, artist and writer as a way of bringing theory into 
action and as an ahistorical critique of the conditions of creative practice and the too 
often limited figure attached to each position. It should be noted that those who occupy a 
liminal, or transdisciplinary, position between art and literature can have as many roots in 
the histories of personal narrative in literature as they do with the histories of art and 
criticism. When Frank O’Hara described the movement ‘Personism’ – a movement 
‘which nobody knows about [and was founded] after lunch […] on August 27, 1959’ – he 
defended writing that ‘is at last between two persons instead of two pages’ (O’Hara 
1961). Michel Foucault’s celebration of the ‘citational’ as an act of ‘collect[ing] what one 
has managed to hear or read’, a practice that recognizes the value of the ‘already-said, by 
the recurrence of discourse’, importantly states that we come to knowledge episodically 
that ‘the writer constitutes his own identity through this recollection of things said’ 
(Foucault 2006: 211–13). This communication, this citational and perhaps vernacular 
form of self-writing, is very different from Guriel’s diminishingly labelled 
‘confessionalism’, which instead is understood to be fraught with shame and the 
unburdening of something that is private in a plea for forgiveness. Writing of her 
grievance and disaffection in the 1970s, Joan Didion’s mode of New Journalism 
illustrates a sense of being awash with political unrest in the wake of catastrophic cultural 
change – anxieties that are still ours now. As contemporary writers depict physical, 
cognitive and political dissonance and demand for social change, writing continues to 
evolve as a fundamental method of political engagement. 
So who, then, gets the privilege to speak? And with what language? Chris Kraus’ 
novel I Love Dick, first published by Semiotext(e) in 1997, chronicles Kraus’ and her 
then-husband Sylvère Lotringer’s cerebral and emotional ménage à trois of letter writing 
in pursuit of the cultural theorist and third party in their narrative fantasy, Dick Hebdige. 
When Dick fails to respond, Kraus continues the project alone, finding an epistolary way 
into writing by addressing her autobiographical fiction and critical essaying to an existent 
person but one who more importantly operates as a transitional object. In letters 
remaining unsent for a sustained period, Kraus writes ‘if I could love you consciously, 
take an experience that was so completely female and subject it to an abstract analytic 
system, then perhaps I have a chance of understanding something and could go on living’ 
(Kraus et al. 2006: 235–36). Earlier she writes that emotion is ‘just so terrifying the world 
refuses to believe it can be pursued as a discipline, as a form’ (2006: 197). Kraus’ project 
arguably transforms the pain of obsessive and unrequited love into a new form of 
philosophy where the self and the body, examined alongside the social apparatuses that 
enable and limit it, occupy an inferential critical space (Myles in Kraus et al. 2006: 15). 
The precarious, the uncertain, the unconfirmed, the somewhat illegitimate 
knowledge uncovered through informal letters, photographs, social events and contracts 
effect how creativity is understood, how it is managed and eventually historicized. As 
Michael Baxandall describes in Patterns of Intention, the inferential critic deduces 
meaning not only from the object(s) but from its origins and development, a process that 
is not only relational but sociable (Baxandall 1987: 137). I Love Dick is a crucial example 
of writing (and distribution) situated within so-called ‘real life’ and the dynamic field of 
social relations. Mckenzie Wark records in his Afterword for Kraus’ novel Torpor that 
‘in writing about the work of others we usually write something about our own’ (Wark in 
Kraus 2015: 298). This sense of self and of social capital – accounting for friendship, 
career, gossip and community relations – is also resounded in Kraus’ critical essay 
‘Sentimental Bitch’ (2002). Writing about Andrea Bowers’ exhibition From Mouth To 
Ear, shown in Los Angeles in 2002 – which she describes as a ‘self-portrait fashioned 
from a Deleuzean sense of self’ – Kraus maintains the belief ‘that who you are is never 
any more or less than who you love, than who has made you larger’ (Kraus 2004: 197). 
Kraus’ Native Agents series, initiated at Semiotext(e) in the late 1980s, demonstrates her 
worthy desire to create a space for publication, distribution and circulation of radical, 
personal, feminist narratives, works by her, at that time, underappreciated and largely 
unread friends or colleagues such as Eileen Myles, Cookie Mueller and Lynne Tillman. 
Lois Klassen, in her 2015 Fillip article ‘Arriving at nowhere’ rightly insists that Kraus’ 
entire writing and editorial project was developed from a necessity of performing a kind 
of ‘public naming’ of the subjectivities, including her own and those of other women 
writers, who were fated to be least described and published (Klassen 2015). In its 
realization, the space of the collectively imagined and desired is a site that is politically 
active where the ‘writers who can’t seem to keep themselves out of their sentences’ 
signal no new crisis in criticism but instead a new grammar of possibility or set of values. 
Both literary and social, and combining the emotional intimacy of friendship with the 
intellectual commitment of critical theory, such practices offer a model of inferential 
criticism that is full of radical possibilities and engages in social ecology and a kind of 
activism. The crux here is that words too are brimming with inferences and references 
and, as Maggie Nelson writes, they ‘change depending on who speaks them’ (Nelson 
2015: 8). It is true that linguistics tells us that the sign is always half someone else’s, or as 
Gavin Butt claims in discussing the ‘crisis of contemporary criticism’ and the 
significance of performativity, gossip and illegitimate knowledge, they are held within ‘a 
viral economy of communication that destabilises the authoritative truth of the documents 
with which […] history is written’ (Butt 2004: 15). Like most historiographies, the truths 
are mostly misrecognized, ill-reasoned, ill-perceived feelings-made-fact. Or we might say 
that the self-reflexive and viral forms of inferential criticism could performatively cause 
things to come into existence. 
From different perspectives and in different contexts, each of Kraus’ books 
forefronts a critical gaze that is turned as much in on itself as the world and composes a 
self-portrait infused with a recurring affective consciousness alongside versions of Kraus 
and her lovers and friends. In an intertextual corporeal game of their own, ‘her 
narratives’, writes Leslie Jamison, ‘bleed and echo, texts wink at one another across their 
separate spines’ (Jamison 2015). Kraus’ novels present tenuously connected visions of 
intimate scenes that in their partial nature play on the reader’s voyeuristic desire for 
autobiographical access and to learn about the private lives of the characters represented 
– characters who happen to be highly visible intellectuals. This creative practice – not to 
delimit reading Kraus’ work as vulnerability and self-exposure as narcissistic acts of 
unmediated ‘confession’ (a descriptor she has consciously resisted), not only courts 
potential disdain but raises discussions of ethics and epistemology. 
In his analysis of confession and its history, Michel Foucault suggests that the 
‘internal ruse’ of confession is the misguided belief that a decision in favour of honest 
speech is an expression of freedom (Foucault 2000: 201). Confession, we are reminded, 
is an act of shame, guilt-laced and often in appeal for absolution. Kraus supports this with 
the claim that confession ‘pursues [a] cheaply cathartic agenda (will everything “change” 
once the confession is made? Doubtful […])’, she writes in her essay ‘Stick to the Facts’ 
(Kraus 2008). In Aliens & Anorexia, she laments that ‘women have been denied all 
access to the a-personal’ and that it seems that the ‘straight female “I” can only be 
narcissistic, confidential, confessional, [that it’s] impossible to conceive a female life 
might extend outside itself’ (Kraus et al. 2006: 197). In a reconsideration of the feminist 
axiom ‘the personal is political’, Kraus argues to Jamison, ‘life is not personal’ (Kraus 
2015). 
‘I would like to present this [story] as an exemplary case’, writes Peter Handke in 
A Sorrow beyond Dreams, his semi-autobiographical novella first published in 1972 
(Handke and ke 2012: 5). Impulsively recounting the suicide of his mother, Handke 
strives to get both himself and his mother out of the story. First appearing as a process of 
abstraction and a resistance to emotionalism, Handke’s ‘confessional’ first person is a 
somewhat muted apersonal, not an exposition of the soul of a novelistic character or 
autobiographical self. Written in quotes and at an exhausting distance, his critical memoir 
makes repeated attempt to theorize his mother’s life and to consider her singular 
existence in a sociopolitical context, so that his words will be applicable to not only his 
mother but also to ‘the biography of a woman with my mother’s particular life’ (2012: 
29–30). ‘The essential is to avoid mere quotations’, Handke expands, 
even when sentences look quoted, they must never allow one to forget that they deal with 
someone who to my mind at least is distinct. Only then, only if a sentence is firmly and 
circumspectly centred on my personal or, if you will, private subject, do I feel I can use 
it. 
(2012: 29–30) 
In writing the story of his mother, ‘second in his own interest’, and lastly ‘like an 
outside investigator […]’, Handke hoped to present an ‘exemplary case’ (2012: 30). His 
memoir is at once a reconciliation tool for the self and all of its iterations; a method of 
lived experience as a form of research; and also a critique – a critique of the world as he 
might see it and one in which we, as readers, are invited to participate. 
What might we be able to offer each other that we are not able to offer ourselves? 
The performative act of critical memoir participates in its own definition, allowing the 
work to sustain a meditation on its own intervention as both an aesthetic and political 
practice. It is an aesthetics of existence linked to an ethics of existence – an imagined and 
reimagined proposal that all sorts of experience hold universal significance and that 
‘there can be no good politics, no flourishing, without care of the self’ (Joy 2015, 
emphasis added). Asking if there can be a just world, in a lecture entitled ‘Can there be a 
feminist world?’ (2015), literary theorist and feminist critic Gayatri Spivak states that 
‘when we think of the ethical in a human being in general, we think of being directed 
toward the other rather than toward the self. It is not necessarily always doing good. […] 
This creates a particular problem for us, as concerned women’, she tells us, ‘because 
women […] are socially obliged to care for others. Socially obliged. In the ethical, 
therefore, we have to learn to work within this contradiction’ (Spivak 2015). And in 
discussing the practice of subjective writing, Joan Didion notes that this ‘is a difficult 
point to admit’, she says, ‘[we are] taught to be diffident, just this side of self-effacing, 
[…] to affect absorption in others [rather than] dwell upon the self’ (Didion 2006: 104). 
You’re the least important person in the room and don’t forget it (2006: 104). She 
continues, ‘for however dutifully we record what we see around us, the common 
denominator of all we see is always, transparently, shamelessly, the impeccable “I”’ 
(2006: 104). Here, we are reminded of Foucault’s legacy of an ‘aesthetics of existence’, 
tracing back to his analysis of the techniques of the self and the souci de soi (care of the 
self) (Foucault 2000: 261). His theory provides an ever-widening scope for questions 
about the material, the form, life or its subjects as a work of art. ‘Thought on thought’, 
Foucault suggested, ‘might open us to certain freedoms and the invention of a manner of 
being that is still improbable’ (Foucault 2000: 137, emphasis added). It is therefore 
possible that as we speak of our own experiences, we inferentially map and transform our 
own conditions or grammar of possibility. Furthermore, we can understand the private-
made-public as an ethics of attentive research and a discursive form of referencing. 
Analysing vulnerability is not the same as enacting it, and reading fragility is not 
the same as speaking it, as writing it. Subjectivity too is keenly relational, we perform 
who we are through the multitude of encounters that assail us and in an exchange that is 
about becoming or unbecoming, about emotions replacing other emotions, our stories 
navigate what is overwhelming. ‘A repository of inner self-relation’, philosopher and 
social theorist Gillian Rose tells us ‘the discovery, simultaneous with the suddenly 
sculpted and composed words, of distance from and deviousness towards myself as well 
as others’ (Rose 1995 35). The author is complicit, is vulnerable and has relinquished a 
safe position. Something is at risk: ‘[we] may be merciful [or we] may be merciless’ 
(Rose 1997: 55). ‘How does one submit to falling forever, to going to pieces?’ asks 
Maggie Nelson (Nelson 2015: 84). 
Maggie Nelson’s hugely celebrated work of memoir and critical theory, The 
Argonauts (2015), deftly moves between perception and idea, quotation and action, in 
examination of family-making and academic life. Her critical memoir considers what it 
means to assume the role of an artist and a scholar and what it means to be perceived to 
submit to the normative while drafting unconventionals taken directly from her life and 
body’s transformations. Like Chris Kraus, her work presents not a privatized confessional 
space but rather a continuum between criticism and autobiography. Early in the book, 
Nelson details a seminar she attended at The City University of New York in October 
1998 where Jane Gallop had been invited to present new work and Rosalind Krauss to 
respond. Recounted is Jane Gallop’s presentation of a series of photographs taken by her 
husband, Dick Blau (now a long-time collaborator), which captured Gallop with their 
baby boy; in the bathtub, by a lake, lounging on the sofa, naked. Gallop is described as 
presenting the work-in-progress which she later went on to publish as Living with His 
Camera (2003), a project addressing photography from the standpoint of the 
photographed subject coupled with the subjective position of being a mother. Nelson 
writes, ‘another position generally assumed to be’, and she remembers Gallop’s words, 
‘troublingly personal, anecdotal, self-concerned’ (Nelson 2015: 40). Living with His 
Camera later goes on to intersect Blau’s images with intimate readings of what it means 
to be a domestic partner, mother and photographic subject. Allying with Roland Barthes, 
Gallop claims her writing to also ‘combine intellectual work with self-reflection, theory 
with memoir’ (Gallop and Blau 2003: 27). 
‘It was Krauss’ turn’, writes Nelson, ‘she scooted her chair up to the table and 
shuffled her papers. She was Gallop’s inverse – sharp face, classy in a silk scarf, Ivy 
League, Upper East Side way. […] She started by saying how important Gallop’s daring 
and thorough work on Lacan had been’, Nelson continues, ‘this praise went on for some 
time. Then, theatrically, she swerved. “The importance of this early work is why it is so 
deeply disturbing to behold the mediocrity, naïveté, and soft-mindedness of the work 
Gallop has presented to us today”’. Nelson describes a thickening of the room as Krauss 
dismembered Gallop for ‘taking her own personal situation as subject matter’. ‘The tacit 
undercurrent of her argument’, Nelson advises, ‘was that Gallop’s maternity had rotted 
her mind – besotted it with the narcissism that makes one think that an utterly ordinary 
experience shared by countless others is somehow unique, or uniquely interesting’ 
(Nelson 2015: 40). 
So, returning to Foucault’s question, what understanding of aesthetics is required 
as a basis for making life a work of art? ‘Couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art?’ 
he asks, ‘why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our lives?’ (Foucault 
2006: 261). The art of living, or the ‘aesthetics of existence’, conceives art as esoteric 
knowledge, entailing a whole set of practices, as well as various modes and purposes of 
productivity. Such intimacy can be understood not as ‘soft-mindedness’ but a whole set 
of strong-minded political and social practices that assert argument, however loose the 
form, however close to real life (2006: 261). As Kraus writes in Torpor, ‘[…] for the first 
time it occurred to her that perhaps the only thing she had to offer was her specificity’ 
(Kraus 2015: 110). Starting with the life she knew best, by writing to Dick, Kraus offered 
her life as a case study and her personal experience is an example of socially entrenched 
problems. As works of institutional critique, both I Love Dick and The Argonauts 
announce the structures, hierarchies and blind spots that continually limit what is 
possible. 
To study the intimate is not always to work in opposition to structures of 
dominance and terms of the dichotomy between the personal and the political, the 
scholarly and the subjective. But instead, to relocate the conditions of possibility and 
relations of production – production of a provocative mode of creative and critical 
inquiry, which has, and continues to be, instrumental in self-organized alternative 
politics. This gives way to an understanding of a selfhood emergent through cultural 
practice. It might not be stable, and it exists because of a multiplicity of manufactures of 
coherent and incoherent self-images. It changes state in different situations, and the 
degree and relations of its determinacy are fluid. ‘If one wants a new way of thinking, 
living, writing, etc. that isn’t founded on the exclusion or exploitation of others’, replies 
Maggie Nelson in an interview with Sarah Nicole Prickett, ‘one has to understand how 
the system comes to be, how it works, how one has been worked over by it, and how one 
has worked it’ (Nelson 2015). 
I am reminded of how you once wrote that you fastidiously shirk power if it 
requires a defilement of others. How you also said that while you have never outright 
lied, that, in holding on to absolute power as well as absolute vulnerability, you might 
have employed a tone of faux sincerity. ‘You speak the language the system will 
recognize’, you said. You went on to state that while you rejected the premises of the 
dichotomy, you were unable to offer a workable alternative. But it is perhaps a change in 
how one wills. In the same interview Nelson speaks of the ‘dichotomy that a lot of people 
are compelled by, […] between the so-called personal and the so-called cerebral or 
critical – to me it’s just one flow’, she says (2015). 
Recreating, cleaning out, starting over, again. The rapidly vanishing and the 
hastily erected. Not long after you moved you said that despite the good feelings of a new 
sense of possibility, you needed the institute of old friends and the sense of the historic to 
remind you of who you are, to see how you see the world. You told me this but your 
sense of place growing more and more distant was palpable, now not feeling at home in 
either before or after. It is not that you have found a sense of self in the nomadic, more 
like you have been left, and left to inexpressibly unravel. 
‘To try to give testimony to lived experience is the most interesting language or 
way of thinking that I could find’, Maggie Nelson says in an interview for Vice 
Magazine. She continues, ‘to demonstrate thinking. You have to write what you have to 
write’ (Nelson 2015). To search out the fact of feeling and transcribe the everyday, its 
interrelated and inferential contexts and enmeshed reference library, collapses the 
distinction between the literary page and social exchange, between writing and living, 
between the public and the private, between the autobiographical and the theoretical or 
the abstract. Yet despite this dialogic ordering of signs, this fabric of writing has long 
been discredited. In The Desire of Mothers to Please Others in Letters, New York School 
poet Bernadette Mayer writes, ‘someone once said to me I wanted to write without 
writing anything so it was just an idea, it was someone who can’t stand to sit still for it’ 
(Mayer 2001: 32) and Nelson reminds us of Victor Howes’ criticism of Anne Sexton’s 
writing, complaining that ‘the confessional mode reveals that people with nothing to hide 
usually have little to confess’ (Howes cited in Nelson 2011: 119). The dismissal of one’s 
self as a signifying body and accusation of not being able to ‘sit still’ for the labour of 
writing evokes a related set of questions about gender, interpretation, value and authority. 
The first thing to be contested is the assumption of exclusive points of reference, the 
ivory tower cut off from everyday lived experience. ‘Life is not personal’, Kraus tells us, 
if this is so then there is no beautiful life of the mind only and there is no such thing as a 
private language, ‘I think it might be worth trying to make one’, writes Mayer (Mayer 
1999: 68). 
The testimony to lived experience and the resulting admittance of ‘you have to 
write what you have to write’ is representative of the resurgent interest in contingency, 
the everyday and the autobiographical that Jason Guriel identifies with his avowed 
irritability towards writers who speak too much – those sentimental truthtelling fuckups – 
like the words that matter least are the ones that should not get said (Notley 1980: 82). 
Yet a writer and an artist in the mood to share is not a new condition. Writing by women 
has routinely been read and received with very distinct assumptions and anxieties 
concerning radical subjectivity and verbal excess as challenges to literature, to art and to 
criticism. Writing the personal, the intimate, the quotidian, the domestic and the 
particular has long been a strategy in the dismantling of patriarchal ideologies and 
discourse and performs models for social reform. The ‘confessional criticism’, or the 
instrumentalized self-disclosure, that Guriel and Howes identify is part of a long 
chronology of provocation in writing as a site for recording subjective experience, 
transgression, emancipation, resistance and to complicate ideas about gender. A whole 
new language has always been a temptation. And so the second thing to contest is the 
tired essentialist equation that denigrates and pathologizes women as matter, as detail, 
and men as form, as generality, and how this translates to the assumption that women 
write intimate liquid language that leaks and is punitory, emotional, dangerous and 
redundant and men write reasoned language that is epic, pragmatic, universal and 
significant, often their sentimentality going unrecognized as such. The phobia of saying 
too much, of wanting too much, of slipping between public and private realms and of 
transgressing ideologies of reason is often bound to paranoia regarding the rapacious 
desires, the labour and the leakages of the female body. It also casts the discussion of 
what women’s writing might be in a negative light, restricting it to questions of content 
and tone, rather than form and language. 
In 1994, Catherine Clément published Syncope: The Philosophy of Rapture, 
twenty years after the introduction of the French theory of écriture féminine. This work, 
an extension of the feminist urgency and political conviction privileging the female body 
and female difference in language and text, concerns forms of writing that arrive from an 
eclipse of thought and at, or rather on, the limits of control, where, at the edge of 
weakness, the body literally convulses or shuts down. Clément borrows the term syncope 
from music theory to advocate for a harmonious and productive discord where an 
‘absence of the self, […] a cerebral eclipse’ might allow for an interval, a new departure 
or even social change (Clement and O’Driscoll 1994: 1). This scenario, Clément 
describes, is both romantic and clinical and is typically diagnosed as an adverse women’s 
condition. She who cannot be silenced because of what her body is doing, she who 
cannot sit still for the labour of writing is illegitimate: 
[…] it is she who sinks down, dress spreading out like a flower, fainting, before a public 
that hurries forward; arms reach out, carry the unresisting body […] People slap her, 
make her sniff salts. When she comes to, her first words will be, ‘Where am I?’ And 
because she has come to, ‘come back’, no one thinks to ask where she has been. The real 
question would be, rather, ‘Where was I?’ But no, when one returns from syncope it is 
the real world that suddenly looks strange. 
(Clement and O’Driscoll 1994: 1) 
The recuperative and citational act of self-writing, concerned with writing the backstory 
of history and unveiling the ways in which power relations are played out, is 
characteristic of écriture féminine’s ‘nerve-based’ approach to language (Elkin 2013: 
141). Syncope is an acceleration, a skipped beat, an illegitimate epistemological rupture 
that comes in a flash – perhaps even a phenomena of the quotidian. This form of reverie, 
as it is presented by Clément, is an enlightening space of telepathic dissonance acting as a 
resistance to the technologies of capital and patterns of patriarchy that colonize reality. 
As an anecdotal poetics, the syncope breaks the duality of mind and body, and as 
memory, reality and fantasy blur, suggests how we might tell our stories and histories 
differently. The legitimates and illegitimates living alongside one another – what we 
might know to know and what we might know to feel. Much like gossip, this telepathic 
phenomenon of the quotidian creates a kind of phantasmal voice network and a sense of 
community – i.e. one woman to another, one writer to another – it also leads to an 
acknowledgement of the multiple within us. 
And so the reprisal of personal writing (a resurgence of confessional self-writing 
to which Guriel refers) demonstrates a renewed depiction of feelings of political dissent 
and shattering cultural unrest – writing that expresses critiques of ideology and the hope 
for another future. Writing that signals that relations of power, and how they play out, is 
still very uncertain. As an act of resistance, writing the personal offers the potential to 
retool critical practice – ‘remember what it was to be me’, writes Didion, ‘that is always 
the point’ (Didion 2006: 104). 
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